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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
The City states the contested issues on appeal in the order they were presented to
the district court.
1.

Whether the district court erred in holding that the City did not violate the

Utah Municipal Bond Act.
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: This case was
decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the standard of review on
appeal for all issues is for correctness. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 571. The parties addressed
this issue in their briefing before the trial court. (R. 135-139, R. 628-630).
2.

Whether the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs' claim for

violation of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-1 et seq., is not ripe
and that Plaintiffs lack standing.
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: The standard of
review on appeal is for correctness. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah
1996). The parties addressed these issues in their briefing before the trial court. (R. 133135, R. 627-628, R. 1049 at 23).
3.

Whether the district court erred in holding that the City's exercise of an

option to repurchase an electrical distribution system was an administrative act not
subject to the referendum power, where exercise of the option was expressly
-1-

contemplated in prior legislation.
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: The standard of
review on appeal is for correctness. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 571. The parties addressed this
issue in their briefing before the trial court. (R. 144-149, R. 637-640, R. 1049 at 35-40).
4.

Whether the referendum power should be interpreted so as to avoid

impairing the obligation of contracts in violation of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: The standard of
review on appeal is for correctness. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 571. The parties addressed this
issue in their briefing before the trial court. (R. 149-152, R1049 P.40 N.10.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The City concurs in the list of important legal provisions contained in the Brief of
Appellants ("Br. App."), at 3. For the Court's convenience, the City has included in its
addendum the Utah Municipal Bond Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-1 et seq., in its
entirety.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellants Robert Low, Joel Palmer, Julia Redd, and Albert Steele (hereinafter
"Plaintiffs") - together with Empire Electric Association, Inc. ("Empire Electric") - are
attempting to thwart the efforts of the City of Monticello to exercise its option to
repurchase the City's electrical system from Empire Electric. Plaintiffs filed a complaint
-2-

alleging (1) that the City violated the Utah Municipal Bond Act and Notice of Debt
Issuance Act in connection with the proposed funding of the repurchase, and (2) that the
City failed to comply with Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act when it closed certain
city council meetings to discuss negotiation strategy regarding the repurchase.
Simultaneously, Plaintiffs and their allies filed papers with the City to initiate a
referendum on the issue of the City's exercise of its option to purchase the electrical
system. The cumulative effect of these actions was to derail the sale pending resolution
of Plaintiffs' claims. In an effort to resolve all issues in a single action, the City of
Monticello counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed referendum
on the City's exercise of the option was neither necessary nor legal. On cross motions for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs' Bond Act claims, granted the
relief the City sought on the referendum issue, and certified its decision as a final
judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. Neither side has appealed the district court's subsequent
ruling on the opening meetings issue.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint on May 12, 2000, seeking a preliminary
injunction and declaratory relief based on two causes of action: (1) violation of the Utah
Municipal Bond Act and Notice of Debt Issuance Act, and (2) violation of the Open and
Public Meetings Act. (Record on Appeal ("R.") 2-10). On July 12, 2000, AppelleesDefendants - the City of Monticello, elected members of the City Council, and the City
Manager (herein collectively "the City") - filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim
-3-

seeking a declaration that the City's exercise of an option was not the proper subject of a
referendum petition promoted by Plaintiffs and their allies. (R. 79).
The City moved for summary judgment on both the complaint and counterclaim.
(R. 116-490). After a period of discovery, Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. (R. 1049). On January 16, 2001, the district court granted the City's
motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claim alleging violation of the Utah Municipal Bond
Act and Notice of Debt Issuance Act and with respect to the City's counterclaim on the
referendum issue, conversely denying Plaintiffs' cross-motion on these claims. (R.
1079). The trial court reserved judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Open
and Public Meetings Act. (R. 1080). In its order dated January 16, 2001, the court
certified the decision as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures. (R. 1084-1087). This timely appeal followed. (R. 1096-1098). Neither
Plaintiffs nor the City has appealed the district court's subsequent memorandum decision
regarding the open meetings claim.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiffs paint an inaccurate and dark picture for the Court. They attempt to
portray a sinister effort by City officials to skirt open meeting laws and underhandedly
approve the repurchase of the City's electrical distribution system. There is no truth to
this portrait. In the proceedings before the district court, the City and Plaintiffs
vigorously debated whether certain meetings of the City Council regarding the proposed
repurchase should have been open to the public. In the end, the district court held that the
-4-

City properly closed most of its meetings while others should have been open to the
public. (R. 1095.) In their haste to imply wrongdoing, however, Plaintiffs ignore their
own critical concession below that the City took no final action in a closed meeting. (R.
1107 at 13:10-12; 1095.)
In any event, whether or not certain City Council meetings should have been
closed is entirely irrelevant to this appeal. Neither Plaintiffs nor the City has appealed the
trial court's ruling on that issue and, given Plaintiffs' concession, it has absolutely no
bearing on whether the City violated the Municipal Bond Act or improperly refused to
hold a referendum - the real issues on appeal.
The City sets forth below the relevant facts established in the record. In sum, as
the district court (Judge Bryner) concluded, the City complied with Utah law when it
voted, in an open meeting and after public comment, to exercise an existing contractual
option to repurchase an electrical system it had once owned. The City carefully observed
the law in all its attempts to finance the still-pending repurchase. Moreover, as the
decision was not the proper subject of a citizen referendum, members of the City Council
approved the repurchase in accordance with the trust conferred on them by virtue of their
public office.
Background Facts
The City sold its electrical distribution system to Empire Electric in 1979. Prior to
doing so, the City Council made the legislative decision to reserve an option allowing the
City to repurchase the system for fair market value after a twenty year period
-5-

commencing on January 1, 1980. (R. 158, 163-175). The distribution system does not
generate power, but merely transmits electricity purchased on the wholesale market to
end users - 641 residential hookups, 182 small commercial hookups, 13 large commercial
or governmental hookups, and various street light hookups. (R. 376-77). The distribution
network comprises wiring, power poles, transformers, substation equipment and other
assets within Monticello and its surrounding environs. (R. 247-37A). The system's
owner, like any retailer, also provides various customer services, such as installing
hookups, responding to emergencies, and billing. (R. 376).
In mid-1997, the City began to consider whether it should exercise its option to
repurchase the system. The City anticipated that it could realize substantial benefits from
doing so, and it retained independent consultants to conduct a full-scale evaluation. The
consultants provided a very positive report to the City regarding the advantages of
repurchasing the system. (R. 365 ^ 4).
On September 8, 1997, the City Council passed Resolution 1997-6 by which it
resolved "that the City of Monticello shall pursue its option to repurchase the municipal
electrical system." (R. 186). That same day, the City notified Empire Electric of the
Council's decision, and the parties commenced negotiations regarding the repurchase.
(R. 184-86). Negotiations became protracted, focusing primarily on determining the fair
market value of the distribution system as required by the 1979 agreement between the
parties. (R. 166-175,365^5).
In 1998, the City and Empire Electric agreed jointly to retain a qualified firm to
-6-

appraise the system, its real and personal property, customer base, capital improvements,
and other features influencing price. (R. 365 f 6). Yet, even after the appraiser issued its
report and the parties agreed to a base value of $1,315,271.00, the City and Empire
Electric continued to dispute the final purchase price. Empire Electric asserted that
certain costs it had incurred should be added to the base market value and taxed to the
City as part of the transaction. (R. 203-29).
In addition, the City conducted its own analysis of the system's value - evaluating
potential revenues versus costs, including acquisition costs, interest, maintenance, etc. as well as other factors affecting the negotiations with Empire Electric. (R. 365A ^ 9).
Engineers retained by the City projected that by maintaining electric utility rates at their
current levels the City could expect annual net revenues averaging between $200,000 and
$300,000 through the year 2019. Alternatively, the City could substantially reduce
electric utility rates for City residents. (R. 231-32).
Throughout this time period, the City administration did everything possible to
communicate facts to the public and to conduct Council deliberations as publicly as
possible, consistent with the need to maintain the confidentiality of the City's negotiation
strategy. Plaintiffs contend that certain City Council meetings were improperly closed.
This issue is not before the Court on appeal and is now utterly irrelevant to this case.
Nevertheless, the Court should be aware that Plaintiffs' suggestion that the City was
engaged in some sort of cover-up or was sneaking around behind the public's back is

-7-

false. The City made tremendous efforts to inform the public.1

]

The City held noticed, open meetings to discuss the proposed repurchase on
January 26, 2000; February 23, 2000; March 1, 2000; March 2, 2000; March 8, 2000;
March 22, 2000; April 6, 2000; April 18, 2000 and April 20, 2000. (R. 160, 239-324,
327-48). It published the non-sensitive results of its revenue projections (R. 235),
circulated an informational handbill regarding the benefits of the repurchase (R. 234-35),
conducted a survey and solicited public comment (R. 286-288, 295-311, 345-46, 367-68),
hosted two special, advertised meetings to receive input, answer questions, and explain
the issues to residents (R. 235, 326-48, 368). When accused in an open meeting of having
pre-decided the issue, Mayor Black affirmed that Council members "ha[d]n't made up
their mind, and they will listen" to public input. (R. 345-46). One or more of the
Plaintiffs appeared and commented at every open or public meeting on the subject. (R.
239-324, 327-48).
The City Council also met periodically in closed meetings to discuss negotiation
strategy regarding the system's repurchase. In the City's view, publicly disclosing these
closed deliberations at the time would have seriously handicapped the City in its
negotiations with Empire Electric. (R. 365A ^ 12). The minutes of these meetings
confirm that they related to negotiation strategy. The City Recorder certified the
Council's compliance with Open Meetings laws. (R. 161, 239-324). In the course of this
litigation, the City provided copies of all minutes and all available transcripts to the
district court for its in camera inspection. (R. 670-975, 977-985). Judge Bryner found
that while most meetings fell within the exception to the Utah Open Meetings Act, some
(or portions thereof) should have been opened to the public. (R.1095). As stated, neither
the City nor Plaintiffs appealed this ruling. The City has now made public the transcripts
of meetings that the court held should have been opened.
Plaintiffs, however, exaggerate Judge Bryner's ruling in an attempt to make it
appear that the City acted deviously. The City was justifiably concerned that Empire
Electric, its local employees and officers, would use information gathered by the City in a
campaign of distortions, delay, and deceit to thwart the City's analysis and, potentially,
the exercise of the repurchase option. (R. 636, 652 at 45: 9:16, 662 at 6:5-7:7 and 36:923). The Monticello system is profitable to Empire Electric, and the company has made it
clear that it opposes the City's repurchase. (E.g., R. 327-28, 785-86, 793-95, 854, 932,
937, 941). Indeed, the facts suggest that Empire Electric is directly sponsoring, or at least
encouraging, this litigation. Employees of Empire Electric were involved in drafting and
obtaining signatures for the referendum petition, the litigation is at least partially funded
by Empire Electric (or an association to which it belongs), and Plaintiffs are represented
by the same law firm that has represented Empire Electric in negotiations regarding the
-8-

On March 22, 2000, the City Council voted in an open meeting to adopt
Resolution 2000-2, which fomially exercised the City's option. (R. 188-89).2 Resolution
2000-3, enacted in another open meeting on April 6, 2000, authorized the future issuance
of bonds to finance the repurchase. (R. 191-94). Again, the City promptly informed
Empire Electric of its actions (R. 370), and Empire Electric responded to the City's
resolutions by approving, accepting, and agreeing to sell the system to the City, as
obligated by its 1979 agreement with the City, although the parties still had not agreed on
a final price. (R. 196-197).
As it became evident that price negotiations would continue beyond January 1,
2000, the City and Empire Electric agreed to extend the date by which to complete the
repurchase until Spring, 2000. In the end, however, additional potential obstacles
surfaced - primarily this lawsuit and a referendum petition circulated by some City
residents regarding the repurchase - and the City and Empire Electric postponed the

repurchase. (R. 146, 941). A reasonable inference from the facts is that Plaintiffs
initiated this lawsuit at the request of Empire Electric.
In any event, as Plaintiffs' counsel conceded in the district court, Council members
made no final decisions in any closed meetings but rather carefully reserved final
judgment for the public meetings. (R. 365A^j 13, 668, 977-985, 1107 (at 13:10-12)). All
final decisions of the City Council are reflected in published resolutions passed by the
Council in open meetings. (R. 188-89, 191-94, 365AU 13).
2

In their statement of facts, Plaintiffs admit that Resolution 2000-2 "fomially
exercisfed] the option to purchase the system" (Brf. App. at 8), but later argue that the
Resolution only expressed the "intent" to exercise the option (Opening Brief, at 18). The
Resolution speaks for itself and unambiguously exercises the option. (R. 188-89).
-9-

closing deadline indefinitely until resolution of this lawsuit. (R. 199-201).
Facts Relating to the Plaintiffs' Utah Municipal Bond Act Claim
The City has pursued without avail at least two sources of potential financing for
its repurchase of the electrical system. First, Resolution 2000-3 approved the issuance of
Electric Revenue Bonds, but when Plaintiffs' threats of litigation and referendum spoiled
the bonds' potential marketability, the City investigated a short-term loan from a private
bank. (R. 366 ^ 17, 482ffl[3, 4). Ultimately, the lawsuit and pending referendum petition
thwarted that financing method as well. (R. 366-66A U 18, 482 \ 5). To date, the City
has not issued any bonds or otherwise incurred any debt relating to the still-incomplete
repurchase of the electrical system from Empire Electric. (R. 366A ^ 19, 482 % 3).
1.

Electric Revenue Bonds.

The adoption of Resolution 2000-3 on April 6, 2000 authorized the future issuance
of "Electric Revenue Bonds," series 2000, of the City of Monticello.3 (R. 191-94).
Resolution 2000-3 was a "parameters resolution," identifying the expected outer-limits of
bonding related to the system's repurchase: a maximum aggregate principal amount for
the bonds of $3,000,000, a maximum expected interest rate of 6.75%, and a maximum
expected maturation period of 26 years. (R. 191-94, 999 at 13:13-21, 15:2-3, 15:21-

3

In contrast to general obligation bonds, which "constitute full general obligations
of the municipality" (Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-19), revenue bonds, including the potential
Electric Revenue Bonds at issue here, are secured only by the revenues generated by the
improvements or facilities that the bonds were issued to fund. See id. § 11-14-17(2).
Because revenue bonds and general obligation bonds are secured in different manners,
different rules govern their issuance.
-10-

16:5).
Six days later, on April 12, 2000, the City voluntarily published a "Notice of
Bonds to Be Issued" in The San Juan Record, formally designated as the City's official
newspaper. (R. 192-93,485). The notice recounted the expected parameters stated in
Resolution 2000-3. (Id.). Publication of the notice was not required by law and the
parameters indicated in the notice and resolution did not bind the issuer: Bonds
ultimately can issue "under whatever terms they end[] up being." (R. 999 at 15:2116:14).
The City's purpose in adopting the parameters resolution and publishing the notice
was simply to begin the "30-day contestability period" for the Electric Revenue Bonds
provided by Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21(4)), but "that 30-day
contestability period is not essential to the lawful issuance of the bonds." (R. 999 at 16:15). Moreover, as the City intended to pledge the operational revenues of the electrical
system as collateral for the Electric Revenue Bonds (meaning that no tax or other general
purpose fund of the City would be used to pay the principal or interest of the bonds), the
City concluded that no bond election was necessary under Utah law. (R. 367 ^j 27.)
Bond counsel later advised the City that by issuing a portion of the Electric
Revenue Bonds as "private activity bonds" within the State of Utah's "private activity
bond volume cap," all of the Electric Revenue Bonds approved by Resolution 2000-3
could be issued tax-exempt and at interest rates significantly below the conventional rates
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for taxable obligations.4 (R. 367, 382, 999 at 15:11-16.) On June 6, 2000, the City
applied for an allocation by the Utah Private Activity Bond Authority ("UPABA") for
bonds in the amount of $1,600,000 or about 65% of the City's total expected Electric
Revenue Bonds related to the system's repurchase. (R. 372-477). The remaining Electric
Revenue Bonds were to issue as non-private activity bonds (i.e., outside of the state
volume cap) and would fund construction of a new substation needed in connection with
the City's purchase of the system. (R. 374-76).5 However, by issuing a portion of the
bonds under the state's volume cap, all bonds could be exempt from tax. (R. 367, 999 at
15:11-16).
The UP ABA approved the City's application on August 10, 2000 and certified an

4

Under federal law, a state can allow certain private activity bonds to be issued taxexempt up to a dollar ceiling imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, i.e., the "volume
cap." See 26 U.S.C. § 146 (2001). Utah allocates its volume cap under guidelines
established by Utah Code Ann. §§ 9-4-501 to -509. An "allocation" within the volume
cap does not constitute the issuance of bonds; indeed, no money passes from the state to
the bond issuer. Rather, the allocation is simply the first in a series of steps to achieve
tax-exempt status for privately issued obligations for qualified projects, the amounts of
which are within the cap. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 9-4-505, -506 (2000).
5

Together, the private activity bonds and the non-private activity bonds constitute
the Electric Revenue Bonds, series 2000, approved in Resolution 2000-3. Plaintiffs fail to
cite to any evidence establishing their contrary contention, i.e., that somehow the private
activity bonds are different from the Electric Revenue Bonds, series 2000. The record is
to the contrary; these bonds are one and the same. (R. 999 at 26-27). Plaintiffs also fail
to support their contention that the form of the bond has been substantially changed and
will require substantial changes in the indenture. Plaintiffs' citations to their own
statement of facts in their summary judgment papers cannot provide the necessary
evidentiary basis because no record evidence supports the allegation. (Id.). The
contention is baseless, false, and should be ignored.
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allocation within the state's volume cap for the year 2000. (R. 479). In so doing, it
reviewed the City's records of public hearings, as well as technical and financial data. (R.
372-477). That allocation has now lapsed because this lawsuit prevented the City from
issuing the bonds within 90 days of the allocation. (R. 366A ^ 24, 482 ^ 7) See Utah
Code Ann. § 9-4-507(1 )(d). To issue the Electric Revenue Bonds as tax-exempt
obligations, the City will now have to reapply to the UP ABA for another allocation of the
volume cap for the year in which the bonds are issued. (Id.).
With the passage of Resolution 2000-3 after public comment, publication of the
Notice of Bonds to Be Issued, and an allocation of the state volume cap from the
UP ABA, the City had only to await negotiation of the final repurchase price to finalize
the terms of the bonds, complete the issuance, and close the repurchase. However, when
threats of this lawsuit and the citizen-initiated referendum petition raised questions as to
whether the City could acquire the system, bond counsel could no longer render an
opinion that the Electric Revenue Bonds would be challenge-free - an opinion required as
a matter of course by any purchaser of the bonds (whether on the open market or through
private placement). (R. 999 at 16:19-23). As a result, the Electric Revenue Bonds have
never issued. (R. 366 ^ 17, 481 ^ 4). Final terms of the Electric Revenue Bonds are yet
to be negotiated according to market conditions at the time of issuance. (R. 367 ^ 25).
2.

The Failed Attempt to Obtain Short-Term Financing from Zions Bank.

Realizing that it could not issue bonds in light of Plaintiffs' threats, the City
investigated other, interim sources of funding. (R. 366 ^f 18). It entered negotiations with
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Zions Bank for a short-term lease agreement or line of credit. The City Council discussed
this funding option at length in work meetings that were noticed and open to the public.
Eventually, it approved entering into such a loan in an open meeting on May 10, 2000.
(R. 970).
Although the loan did not require a formal opinion of bond counsel, the City could
not enter the agreement unless, as required in the financing papers, it could covenant and
warrant that there was no threatened "adverse litigation." (R. 1012-14). Additionally,
while the loan was denominated a "lease/purchase" agreement, it was clearly not intended
to divest the City of the very system it would use the loan to reacquire, but, as with a trust
deed, the City would retain equitable title to the system and operate it during the entire
term of the loan. (R. 1007-1026). As it happened, all negotiations regarding the loan
abruptly terminated when Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case. (R. 652 at 107:15108:14).
In short, the City has not issued any bonds or otherwise incurred any debt relating
to the repurchase of the electrical system. (R. 366A lj 19, 482 If 3). Moreover, it has
abandoned any intent to pursue a short-term loan from Zions Bank. (R. 366A ^f 20).
Upon conclusion of this case, the City intends to issue the tax-exempt Electric Revenue
Bonds, series 2000, which have already been approved by Resolution 2000-3 and noticed
to City residents in the Notice of Bonds to Be Issued. (R. 366A ^ 21).
Facts Relating to the City's Counterclaim Regarding a Referendum
In late 1999 and early 2000, a number of City residents inquired about the City's
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proposed repurchase of the electrical distribution system. In response, the City Council
hosted various well-publicized public meetings to receive comments regarding the
proposed repurchase. (R. 2355 286-288, 295-311, 326-48, 367-68).
Some residents, including Plaintiffs, urged the City Council to submit the decision
of whether to repurchase the system to a public vote. City officers repeatedly explained
that such a vote would be improper as the decision of how the City fulfills its duty to
supply utility services to residents is an administrative decision. (R. 262, 286-88). At the
City Council meeting on March 22, 2000, Plaintiffs presented an unofficial petition
signed by approximately 270 City residents, encouraging the City to hold an election to
allow the citizens to determine whether the City should purchase the electrical system.
(R. 295-311). The Council considered the petition, but voted to adopt Resolution 2000-2
and thereby exercise its option to repurchase the system. (R. 188-89, 286-90).
On April 14, 2000, the San Juan County Clerk received eleven official
Referendum Petition packets pertaining to Resolution 2000-2 and containing a total of
367 signatures. The clerk verified the petition signatures, certifying that 355 signatures
were from registered voters. (R. 350). The City Recorder independently reviewed these
signatures and found that 349 were registered voters residing in the City of Monticello.
(R. 352). The Recorder concluded that the number of signatures "exceed[ed] the number
required by Section 20A-7-601, Utah State Code, and [was] sufficient for submission to a
vote of the people if required by law." (Id.). Finally, the City Attorney prepared the
ballot title for the proposed referendum. However, in a letter dated April 24, 2000, the
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City Attorney stated he had " serious doubts that Resolution No. 2000-2 is a proper
subject for a referendum petition." (R. 354).
The City has not held and does not intend to hold a referendum regarding
Resolution 2000-2. (R. 368 ^ 29). In identical letters dated June 29, 2000, the City
Recorder fomially infomied the petition sponsors that a referendum on Resolution 2000-2
would not be held:
Resolution No. 2000-2 constitutes the City of Monticello's decision to
exercise its option to repurchase the electrical distribution system owned by
Empire Electric Association. The decision to repurchase the utility is a
purely administrative decision that is not the proper subject of a referendum
within the meaning of Section 1, Article VI, of the Utah Constitution.
Moreover, a successful referendum would impair the City's contract with
Empire Electric and violate the Contracts Clause of the Utah and United
States Constitutions.
(R. 357-362).6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim

under the Utah Municipal Bond Act. Plaintiffs' arguments are based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the Bond Act's notice provisions. Contrary to Plaintiffs' position,
the Bond Act does not mandate that the City give notice of the bonds at issue here.
Rather, the Act provides that if such notice is given, a 30-day contestability period is

Absolutely no record evidence supports Plaintiffs' contention (Br. App. at 11) that
the City rejected a referendum only when it allegedly learned that residents might defeat
the repurchase. The contention is false. Evidence indicates that a majority of residents
support the repurchase (R. 287) and that City officials considered the repurchase an
administrative decision from the beginning. (R. 286-88.)
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triggered, after which time future challenges to the bonds are time-barred. Thus, for a
municipality to take advantage of the 30-day limitations period, notice of the general
parameters of the bond's terms must be provided. However, these are only parameters.
The notice does not - and typically cannot - pinpoint the bonds' ultimate terms, since that
can only be dictated by the market at the time the bonds issue. The notice merely reflects
the general parameters outlined by the authorizing resolution. Moreover, Plaintiffs' claim
that the City will attempt to issue and market bonds in violation of the parameters set out
in its April 12, 2000, notice is without any evidentiary basis. In fact, as a practical matter,
it would virtually be impossible for the City to market bonds whose terms exceeded the
notice; no one would buy them because they would not enjoy the protections of the Bond
Act. Given this, Plaintiffs' Bond Act claim suffers from serious ripeness and standing
problems.
2.

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment on the City's

counterclaim on the referendum issue. The City's decision to exercise its option to
repurchase the electrical system was an administrative act expressly contemplated by a
prior legislative enactment of the City Council. Under well established law,
administrative acts are not subject to the referendum power. Moreover, affirming the
district court's decision on this issue will avoid a serious potential conflict with the
contracts clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs asserted just two causes of action against the City in their Verified
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Complaint: The first challenged the City's attempts to secure financing for its repurchase
of the electrical distribution system; the second asserted violations of the Open and Public
Meetings Act. (R. 2-10). After admitting the City never took final actions in any closed
meetings, Plaintiffs declined to appeal the district court's order on the open meetings
issue. Plaintiffs' sole remaining claim attacks the legality of the City's efforts to obtain
financing. In this brief, the City will first demonstrate that Plaintiffs' claim that the City
violated the Utah Municipal Bond Act (the "Bond Act") is without merit.7 The City will
then refute Plaintiffs' argument that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
on the City's counterclaim regarding the referendum issue.
I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE UTAH MUNICIPAL
BOND ACT IS SUBSTANTIVELY WITHOUT MERIT.
Plaintiffs labor under a persistent misunderstanding of the Bond Act. They

acknowledge that because the City intends to issue revenue bonds, a vote of City
residents to approve the bonds is not required, but they argue (1) that an accurate notice
of intent is a precondition to issuing the bonds and (2) that the City's notice in this case

7

The claims asserted in the Verified Complaint differ drastically from the
arguments asserted on appeal. The Complaint attacks an alleged "bond anticipation
note," a financing vehicle never considered by the City, and attempts to assert claims
under the Notice of Debt Issuance Act, a statute that applies only to bonds that residents
have already rejected in an election but which the municipality persists in issuing.
Likewise, Plaintiffs inexplicably averred that the City violated provisions of the
Municipal Bond Act that set qualifications for voters to participate in bond elections (§
11-14-6), govern the registration and exchange of bonds (§ 11-14-16), and establish the
negotiable validity of bonds that have already been issued (§ 11-14-20). (R. 3-6). None
of these provisions is at issue on appeal.
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was somehow deficient. The Bond Act refutes both contentions.
A.

Publication of a Notice to Issue Bonds is Not Mandatory.

First, the very portions of the Bond Act quoted by Plaintiffs confirm that
publication of a notice of intent to issue bonds is completely optional under the statute.
Section 11-14-21 provides that a city "may provide for the publication of any resolution
or other proceeding adopted by it under this chapter" and "may, in lieu of publishing the
entire resolution or other proceeding, publish a notice of bonds to be issued . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 11-14-21(2) & (3) (emphasis added).
Likewise, § 11-14-20 provides unambiguously:
. . . . No ordinance, resolution or proceeding in respect to the
issuance of bonds hereunder shall be necessary except as
herein specifically required, nor shall the publication of any
resolution, proceeding or notice relating to the issuance of
bonds be necessary except as herein required. . . .
(Emphasis added)
Plaintiffs cite absolutely no authority for their contrary assertion. The Act makes clear
that bonds can be issued legally without the publication of any notice.
Publication of the notice does serve a critical purpose, however. If a city wants to
impose a 30-day statute of limitations on persons seeking to contest the bonds, it may do
so by publishing the bond notice:
For a period of 30 days after the publication any person in
interest may contest the legality of such resolution or
proceeding, any bonds which may be authorized by such
resolution or proceeding, or any provisions made for the
security and payment of the bonds. After the 30-day period
no person may contest the regularity, formality, or legality of
-19-

such resolution or proceeding for any cause.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21(4). Therefore, publication of a proper bond notice provides a
"safe harbor" - a self-triggered statute of limitations - which precludes any challenge of
the legality of the bond issue more than 30 days after the publication. But again, a notice
does not legally affect the ultimate issuance of bonds.8

8

Blaine L. Carlton, the City's expert bond counsel, explained this concept in his
deposition (R. 999 (at 15-16)):
A:

[Mr. Carlton] Let me just make one other observation. The regardless of what the parameters resolution says, the bonds could
have been issued by the municipality under whatever terms they
ended up being.

Q:

[Plaintiffs' counsel] How so?

A:

Well, because the parameters resolution, the purpose of the
parameters resolution is to begin the 30-day contestability period, but
under Utah law, that 30-day contestability period is not essential to
the lawful issuance of the bonds.

Q:

But is it fair to say that notice is required before they can be lawfully
issued?

A:

Well, I'm not sure what you mean by notice.

Q:

It's my understanding that when bonding is anticipated, subject to
section 11-14-21-3 [sic], that notice must first be given to the
citizens.

A:

Thai is not correct. It may be given to the citizens, but that's not a
requirement for the bonds to be issued legally.
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B.

The Terms Stated in the Notice of Intent Do Not Control the Terms of
the Bonds as Ultimately Issued.

For the same reasons that a notice is not required by the Act, the Act also provides
that the voluntary publication of a notice will not bind the issuer to temis that ultimately
prove unworkable in a volatile market.
Of course, when an issuer publishes a notice it attempts to do so accurately. The
notice reflects the "best guess" projections for the bonds as authorized in a parameters
resolution, usually allowing some wiggle room to account for market fluctuations.
However, the final terms of the bonds are never predictable with certainty.
The parameters resolution and notice necessarily predate the ultimate issuance of
bonds, and sometimes by lengthy periods. After the initial resolution and notice, the
issuer, as in this case, may apply to the UP ABA for a state volume cap allocation in order
to issue the bonds on a tax-exempt basis. If a volume cap allocation is granted, the issuer
still has 90 days in which to complete issuance of the bonds. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-4507(l)(d). Moreover, as explained above, the notice of issuance triggers a 30-day safe
harbor, the aim of which is to allow challenges of the bonds before issuance because after
issuance, provided the Bond Act has been complied with, the bonds "shall be
incontestable in the hands of bona fide purchasers or holders for value." Id. § 11-14-20.
Most critically, the market, not the issuer's projections, ultimately controls the
final terms of the bonds. An economic up-swing or down-turn can dramatically affect the
interest rate, and thus overall size, of the bonds that are to be traded on the open market -
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even for tax-exempt obligations. Final terms are negotiated on the very day of issuance;
until then, the issuer can only operate based on reasonable conjecture. (R. 367 ^f 25, 999
at 26-27).
To reiterate, the only purpose of a notice to issue bonds is to trigger the safe
harbor. If the City ultimately issues bonds that are consistent with the notice it
voluntarily publishes, it is entitled to the benefit of a 30-day limitations period. But if the
bonds ultimately issued are not consistent with the publication, the bond issue still is
valid. The only difference is that the bond issue would lose the protections of the
shortened contestability period and ultimately of the Bond Act itself. Section 11-14-20
provides:
Bonds issued under this Act shall have all the qualities of
negotiable paper, shall be incontestable in the hands of bona
fide purchasers or holder for value and shall not be invalid for
any irregularity or defect in the proceedings for their issuance
or sale. .. .
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-20. Failure to comply with the Bond Act, say by publishing a
fraudulent notice and failing to comply with its terms, would vitiate the protections of the
Bond Act for investors. The bonds would therefore be subject to challenge by voters like
Plaintiffs.
C.

The City's Notice of Bonds to Be Issued Fully Complies with Utah Law
and Reflects the Good Faith Parameters Set by the City for the Bonds.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that, after authorizing issuance of the Electric Revenue
Bonds in Resolution 2000-3, the City published a Notice of Bonds to Be Issued pursuant
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to § 11-14-21. Plaintiffs' only complaint on appeal is that the principal amount of the
bonds as projected in the notice was too high and the interest rate was too low.
The City's notice of issuance simply informed residents that the City Council had
adopted Resolution 2000-3 in which it authorized the future issuance of Electric Revenue
Bonds, series 2000, to fund the repurchase of the electrical distribution system. The
notice recounted terms projected for the bonds in the parameters resolution. Specifically,
as Plaintiffs recognized in their Verified Complaint (R. 3-4), the notice
provided the name of the issuer the purpose of the issue, the
type of bonds, [an aggregate principal amount of not to
exceed $3,000,000,] the maximum principal amount that may
be issued, the maximum number of years over which the
bonds may mature and other requirements of notice pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 11-14-21. (Emphasis added).
On its face, the notice was not intended to be a final expression of the terms of the bonds,
for final terms were not - and have not yet been - negotiated. (R. 999 at 25-26). The
notice merely set the outside parameters.
In every respect, the City has acted above-board and consistent with Utah law in
all efforts to obtain financing. Contrary to the Plaintiffs' representations, the projections
of the notice are consistent with the refined projections later used in applying for the
volume cap allocation. Plaintiffs disregard the record and assert that only the private
activity bonds to be issued under a volume cap allocation will be tax exempt. The record
demonstrates, however, that by issuing a portion of the bonds within the volume cap, all
bonds should be exempt from taxes and thus will issue at a decreased interest rate. The
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tax exempt rate noted in the UP ABA application (as of June 6, 2000) was 6.37% for tax
exempt obligations (R. 378) - clearly less than the 6.75% rate predicted in the Notice of
Bonds to Be Issued.9
The City Council deliberated all financing options - both the Electric Revenue
Bonds and the interim loan from Zions Bank - in open meetings noticed to City residents.
It published the notice consistent with the best information regarding the bonds then
available and with the intent of triggering the 30-day safe harbor period as provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21. And it acted on the advice of expert counsel, following
routine procedures for municipal bonding. Critically, the City has expressly disclaimed in
the record any intent to issue new debt instruments for which it has not already published
notice. (R. 120-21, 199).10
D.

Plaintiffs Attack a Result that, as a Practical Matter, Will Never Occur,
Raising Serious Ripeness and Standing Concerns.

While the Bond Act does not mandate an exact symmetry between the notice and
the terms of the bonds as they ultimately issue, practical realities prevent the issuance of

9

Of course, no one can exactly foretell the interest rate that will ultimately matter,
i.e., the rate at the time of issuance.
10

Plaintiffs' references to the City's attempted short-term financing is yet another
attempt to cloud the issue. Irrelevant to the legality of the bond issuance, the loan the
City attempted to negotiate with Zions Bank was simply a stop-gap measure to meet a
strict time deadline for closing the repurchase with Empire Electric and to fund the
transaction until the bonds authorized by Resolution 2000-3 and noticed in the Notice of
Bonds to Be Issued could be issued. Contrary to Plaintiffs' innuendo, the loan was
discussed and approved in open meetings of the City Council. (R. 970.) In the end,
Plaintiffs' actions destroyed that financing option as well.
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bonds with terms that exceed the projections stated in the parameters resolution and
notice. Thus, Plaintiffs' fear that the City will issue bonds inconsistent with the notice in
this case is unfounded. Moreover, the fear - based purely on conjecture about how the
bonds will look when this matter finally concludes - cannot support a challenge to the
bonds at this juncture.
As a practical matter (though not a result legally mandated by the statute), no
bonds will ever issue unless within parameters published in a notice: The lack of proper
notice would render the bonds essentially unmarketable. As explained, the protections of
the Bond Act are vitiated for investors if the terms of the bonds as issued exceed the
limits set by the notice. All purchasers of bonds, whether on the open market or through
private placement, demand as a matter of course that an issuer's bond counsel opine as to
the legality of the bonds. (R. 999 at 16:19-23.) But without a safe harbor preventing
future challenges to the bonds - a result that comes only by publishing notice or a copy of
the parameters resolution - no counsel could conclude that the bonds are challenge-free.
Moreover, the issuer would be obliged to warn investors of the potential for challenges.
Given these realities, if market conditions change to the point that the parameters
projected in the notice are inaccurate, or if no notice is provided at all, the bonds would
be subject to challenge and no investor would touch them.11

n

There are additional constraints, as well. City officials cannot act ulta vires or
stray beyond the limited authority granted in the parameters resolution (and reflected in
the notice). Moreover, issuing bonds with terms that exceeds those approved by
resolution in an open meeting could expose the City to claims of procedural violations,
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In this case, of course, the City published its notice, and Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit
challenging the City's financing plans within the 30-day contestability period. The irony
is, Plaintiffs do not challenge the City's ability to bond, the form of the proposed Electric
Revenue Bonds authorized by the Resolution 2000-3, or the manner of bonding - the
types of challenges contemplated by the Bond Act. They concede, for example, that
because the proposed bonds are revenue bonds, and not general obligation indentures, no
bond election is required.
Instead, they assert a claim which the Court really cannot assess at this juncture.
They attack terms of bonds that are still just hypothetical.12 More than a year since the
City Council published the notice, the Electric Revenue Bonds, series 2000, have not yet
issued. And while the City operated on the basis of reasonable projections in adopting
Resolution 2000-3, publishing the notice, and later applying for a state volume cap
allocation from the UP ABA, final terms of the bonds have yet to be negotiated.

such as claims under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.
12

As pled, Plaintiffs' first cause of action alleges that the City intends to issue debt
instruments which are different from the Electric Revenue Bonds described in the April
12, 2000 "Notice of Bonds to Be Issued" without complying with the Bond Act. See
Complaint ^ 12-15, 17. (R. 4-5). The district court rejected this argument among other
reasons because it was unripe and purely hypothetical. On appeal, in apparent
recognition of the unripeness, Plaintiffs attempt to trim their argument, contending that
"the City misrepresented to its residents in both the notice of intent to issue and in the
information on file with the City" the terms of the bonds to be issued. Br. App. at 21.
Thus, Plaintiffs conclude, the City failed to comply with § 11-14-21(3) and so "cannot
issue the proposed revenue bonds based on that notice." Id. But this maneuver does not
solve Plaintiffs' ripeness problems.
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However, despite Plaintiffs' fears that these terms will exceed the parameters projected in
the April 12, 2000 Notice of Bonds to Be Issued, no one can tell until the bonds actually
issue whether the terms will be consistent with the notice or not.
In this regard, Plaintiffs' claim that the notice is flawed and that it is impossible for
the City to issue bonds pursuant to its terms (Br. App. at 21, 25) is plainly premature and
calculated simply to confuse. See Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 624 P.2d
1138, 1148 (Utah 1981) (ripeness); Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595
(Utah App. 1993) (same). As stated, if the City someday issues its bonds with terms that
violate the parameters of the notice (and thus of the City Council's resolution), the
protections of the Bond Act will be forfeited. Plaintiffs could then sue claiming that the
City had exceeded its authority under the resolution and that the bonds are therefore
invalid. But whether the City will - or even could - issue such bonds is pure speculation.
All evidence indicates that the City fully intends to issue bonds within the parameters of
the notice. (R. 120-21,199). If that outcome is impossibly optimistic, as Plaintiffs
contend, then the City will be forced to issue a new notice. As a practical reality, the City
could never market bonds that do not meet the parameters of its notice.
In sum, Plaintiffs grossly misread the notice provisions of the Bond Act: Notice is
not legally mandatory but operates simply to trigger a 30-day contestability period after
which time future challenges to the bonds are barred. Further, the notice does not
precisely pinpoint the bonds' terms; rather, it reflects general parameters outlined by the
authorizing resolution because final terms cannot be negotiated until the bonds ultimately
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issue. All this said, marketing considerations typically require a notice as a practical
matter. Thus, Plaintiffs' fear that the City will issue bonds in excess of the parameters set
out in its April 12, 2000 Notice of Bonds to Be Issued is groundless; indeed, such a claim
suffers from serious ripeness and standing problems. The Court should affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Bond Act claim.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CITY'S COUNTERCLAIM.
In an effort to put an end to Plaintiffs' attempts to disrupt the repurchase, the City

brought a counterclaim seeking a declaration that it had no legal duty to hold a
referendum on the exercise of the option. The district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor or the City on this claim.
A.

Any Legal Challenge to the City's Refusal to Hold a Referendum on
Resolution 2000-2 (Exercising the Option) Is Now Time Barred.

As the City argued below, any challenge to the City's refusal to hold a referendum
is time barred.13 On June 29, 2000, the City informed the sponsors of the referendum
petition seeking to void Resolution 2000-2 (exercising the option to re-purchase the
electrical system) that the City would refuse to hold the requested referendum on the
ground that the exercise of the option was not subject to the referendum power. R. 357-

13

The district court declined to address this issue, instead granting summary
judgment on substantive grounds. Nevertheless, this Court is free to affirm the district
court's ruling on any proper ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892,
895 (Utah 1988) ("[W]e may affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s), despite
the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling.")
-28-

62; 368 ^| 29. Once the City refused to hold the referendum, Plaintiffs (or any other voter)
had available a very specific remedy with a very short deadline. The Legislature has
expressly directed that such challenges be brought in the Supreme Court within ten-days:
(4)

(a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any referendum
petition, any voter may apply to the Supreme Court for an
extraordinary writ to compel him to do so within ten days after the
refusal.

Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4) (emphasis added).
Thus, when the City refused to hold the referendum, Plaintiffs' remedy was to file
a petition for extraordinary writ with the Utah Supreme Court within 10 days after the
refusal. To date, Plaintiffs (nor any other City voter) have never filed such a petition.
Accordingly, the City was entitled to a ruling that any such challenge is now time-barred.
In the district court, Plaintiffs responded that because the City filed a counterclaim
on July 12, 2000 - 13 days after the City's refusal to hold the referendum - seeking a
declaration that its refusal to hold a referendum was proper, Plaintiffs were absolved of
any responsibility to apply to the Supreme Court for relief. Plaintiffs reasoned that under
the time computation rule in Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the City's
counterclaim had been filed after only 8 days had passed, thus satisfying § 20A-7607(4)'s 10-day rule for Plaintiffs to file in the Supreme Court. [Plaintiffs' reply, p. 2] (R.
594).
This argument is obviously wrong. Even assuming Rule 6(a) applies to § 20A-7607(4), the statute expressly requires that a voter apply to the Supreme Court for an

-29-

extraordinary writ. Prior to 1994, "nothing in the statutes governing direct legislation
explicitly provide[d] a remedy" for a city's refusal to allow a referendum. Bigler v.
Vernon, 858 P.2d 1390, 1392 (Utah 1993). Some sort of "mandamus action seeking to
compel defendants" to comply with the law was apparently the appropriate remedy. Id.
Typically, such an action was brought in the Supreme Court, though there have been
exceptions.14 In 1994-95, however, the Legislature enacted several new provisions
expressly clarifying that the appropriate recourse where voters claim local officials are
obstructing the right to hold a referendum is to petition the Supreme Court for relief
within 10 days. See Utah Code Ann. 20A-7-607(4), -608(4), and -610(4). There is
absolutely no merit to the argument that an aggrieved voter can ignore these carefully
defined procedures and their established deadlines and sue first in the district court.
In any event, Plaintiffs never filed a claim in the district court challenging the
City's refusal to hold a referendum on Resolution 2000-2. It is untenable to suggest that
the City's attempt to obtain a declaration that any such claim is invalid constitutes just
such a valid claim for purposes of the limitations period.
Further, it cannot be forgotten that the ten-day time limit in § 20A-7-607(4) exists
for extremely good reasons. As in this case, time is often of the essence. The

14

Original actions were filed in the Supreme Court in Keigley v. Bench, 63 P.2d
262 (Utah 1936) ("Keigley F), Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939) {"Keigley IF),
Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581 (Utah 1953), and Shriver v. Bench, 313 P.2d 475,
476-77 (1957). In Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964), and Wilson v. Manning,
657 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah 1982), the plaintiffs apparently sought relief first in the district
court.
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interminable delays Plaintiffs have intentionally caused have severely disrupted the
financing of a transaction that is manifestly in the best interest of City residents. (R. 231 32, 365.) Expeditious resolution of referendum disputes involving bond financing is
imperative. The Utah Supreme Court has "emphasized previously the importance of
strict compliance with the time limitation contained in [the referendum statute]." Bigler,
858 P.2d at 1392. Plaintiffs could have sought appropriate judicial relief within the
established time frame to force a referendum on Resolution 2000-2. They did not. Any
such challenge is now barred.
B.

The District Court Correctly Held That the City's Exercise of the
Option Was an Administrative Act Not Subject to a Referendum.

The district court's decision was undoubtedly correct on the merits. In high
dudgeon, Plaintiffs raise the specter of an impending "tyranny" in Monticello if a
referendum is not held forthwith to determine the "will of the people" about whether the
City should exercise its option. See Br. App. at 11. Carried away by such rhetoric, the
Plaintiffs seem to have forgotten that the decision to exercise the City's option to
purchase the electrical system was made by the people's own elected representatives on
the City Council - not by a military junta.
Hyperbole aside, the real issue is whether the City's exercise of an option it had
previously reserved in 1979 constitutes a legislative act, which is subject to a referendum,
or an administrative act, which is not. When the facts of this case are carefully analyzed
under applicable law, it becomes evident that the district court correctly held that it was
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an administrative act not subject to a referendum power.
1.

Administrative Acts Are Not Subject To Referenda.

The Utah Constitution allows citizens to veto the legislative acts of law-making
bodies through a referendum:
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested .. . [i]n the people of the
State of Utah, as hereinafter stated: . . . . The legal voters . . . of any legal
subdivision of the State . . . may require any law or ordinance passed by the
law making body of said legal subdivision to be submitted to the voters
thereof before such law or ordinance shall take effect.
Art. VI, § 1. Utah statutory law affirms this right with respect to municipal legislation.
See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-102 (1998).
For nearly a century, however, courts interpreting analogous constitutional
provisions have distinguished between legislative acts and administrative acts. See, e.g.,
Yarbrough v. Donaldson, 170 P. 1165 (Okla. 1918). As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the right
to hold a referendum applies only to legislative enactments, not to administrative
decisions. See, Br. App. at 12. The Utah Supreme Court first recognized this important
distinction in Keigley I, 63 P.2d 262 (Utah 1936), and has consistently reaffirmed it since.
See, e.g., Keigley II, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939); Shriver v. Bench, 313 P.2d 475, 476-77
(1957); Birdv. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964); Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251,
253 (Utah 1982).15

15

The Supreme Court in Keigley //held that the constitution's "wording . . . clearly
expresses the intention to limit the referendum to acts of [a city's] governing body
performed in the execution of its function as a 'law making' [or legislative] body," and
not to "administrative" or "executive" acts:
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Therefore, "[t]he determinative question is whether or not the action of the City
Council was administrative or legislative. If the former, it is not subject to referendum."
5zr</, 394 P.2d at 808.
2.

Utah's Test for Determining Whether a Municipal Act Is Legislative
or Administrative Focuses on Whether the Municipality Has Created
New Law or Acted Pursuant to Existing Law.

Distinguishing between administrative and legislative acts is often challenging.
The mere label of an act - e.g., ordinance, resolution, etc. - is irrelevant. Keigley I, 63
P.2d at 265. Courts instead look to the substance of the act in its larger factual and legal
context to determine whether the government body has acted in a legislative capacity or
pursuant to existing legislation, i.e., administratively. "[WJhether a particular municipal
activity is 'administrative' or is 'legislative' often depends not on the nature of the action
but the nature of the legal framework in which the action occurs." Foster v. Clark, 790
P.2d 1, 7 (Or. 1990). Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the
"determinative test" is:
Does the later ordinance make a new law or execute one already in
existence? The answer to the question should, we think, be sought by
inquiring whether such changes may reasonably be viewed as clearly within

Article 6 is entitled, "Legislative Department." Prior to 1900 the legislative
power was by Section 1 thereof vested in the legislature. Such section was
amended in that year to vest such power in the legislature and the people,
and provided for the initiative and referendum. . . . It seems clear to us that
the intention evidenced by such amendment was to vest legislative power and such power only - directly in the people . . . .
89P.2dat483.
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the ambit of the voters' intention when the original ordinance was adopted
by them.
Wilson, 657 P.2d at 252-53 (quoting Keigley II, 89 P.2d at 484). In Wilson, the Supreme
Court extended this principle beyond laws passed by the electorate to laws originally
passed by the legislature:
This same principle is applicable to amendments to original laws or
ordinances not "adopted" by the voters in a referendum. In that event, the
governing consideration is the "intended purpose and policy" expressed by
the enacting authority, as disclosed in the terms of its enactment and any
other acceptable evidence of intent.
Id. at 253.
In this regard, Utah law is consistent with the established law in other jurisdictions.
In short, "[t]he crucial test, for determining that which is legislative and that which is
administrative, is whether the ordinance was one making a law or one executing a law
already in existence." Amalgamated Transit Union-Div. 757 v. Yerkovich, 545 P.2d 1401,
1404 (Or. App. 1976) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted); see also Wichita
v. Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d 667, 671-72 (Kan. 1994) ("An ordinance that
makes new law is legislative, while an ordinance that executes an existing law is
administrative."); MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.55 (3rd Ed.
1996) (Revised Vol.) ("In essence, if the proposed initiative would put into execution
previously declared policies or laws, it is administrative in nature.").
The Utah Supreme Court has also considered two other helpful factors in
analyzing whether an act is legislative or administrative: (1) permanency and generality,
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and (2) practicality. Regarding the first, the Supreme Court in Shiver v. Bench stated:
The authorities uniformly stress that actions which relate to subjects of a
general or permanent character are usually legislative, while those of a
temporary nature are usually administrative.
313 P.2d at 478; see also Wichita v. Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d 667, 671-72
(Kan. 1994) ("Permanency and generality are key features of a legislative ordinance.")
Regarding the second, the Supreme Court has stated that the "practical exigencies
of the operation of city government" are an important factor in the analysis. Shiver, 313
P.2d at 478; see also Wilson, 657 P.2d at 253 (reviewing Shriver).
"This is one of the bases of reasoning relied on by the courts in passing on
whether a proposed action is legislative or administrative. If the result
would be to impair the efficient administration of the municipality, the
courts tend toward the conclusion that initiative and referendum provisions
are not applicable."
Wilson, 657 P.2d at 253 (quoting Shiver, 313 P.2d at 478). This factor, together with the
others set out above, require the court to engage in a fact specific inquiry when deciding
whether an act is legislative or administrative. JVhitehall v. Preece, 956 P.2d 743, 749
(Mont. 1998).
In an influential opinion, the Supreme Court of Kansas in Wichita v. Kansas
Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1994), articulated four helpful guidelines which
encapsulate the foregoing principles and provide some additional guidance.16 The first

16

The Kansas Taxpayers Network guidelines have been adopted in Town of
Whitehall v. Preece, 956 P.2d 743, 749 (Mont. 1998), and Johnson v. City of
Alamogordo, 910 P.2d 308, 312 (N.M. 1996).
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guideline is the "determinative test" - i.e., the distinction between making new law
(legislation) and acting pursuant to existing law (administration) - first set forth in
Keigley II and reaffirmed in Wilson. "The other three guidelines expand upon and add to
that distinction." Preece, 956 P.2d at 749 (adopting guidelines). The guidelines are:
1.
An ordinance that makes new law is legislative, while an ordinance
that executes an existing law is administrative. Permanency and generality
are key features of a legislative ordinance.
2.
Acts that declare public purpose and provide ways and means to
accomplish that purpose generally may be classified as legislative. Acts
that deal with a small segment of an overall public policy question generally
are administrative.
3.
Decisions which require specialized training and experience in
municipal government and intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other
affairs of a city in order to make a rational choice may properly be
characterized as administrative, even though they may also be said to
involve the establishment of a policy.
4.
No one act of a governing body is likely to be solely administrative
or legislative, and the operation of the initiative and referendum statute is
restricted to measures which are quite clearly and fully legislative and not
principally executive or administrative.
Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d at 671-72.
3.

The City's Exercise of an Option It Retained in 1979 Was an
Administrative Act Not Subject to Referendum.

Application of the foregoing principles and guidelines demonstrates that the
ordinance exercising the option was an administrative act which is not subject to
referendum.
a.

First and most critically, the City did not make new law when
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it exercised the option but rather availed itself of an opportunity which previous
legislative acts had expressly contemplated and reserved. Prior to 1979, the City of
Monticello owned its electrical distribution system. The City had previously made the
legislative decision to provide electricity to its residents, whether directly or through a
third party. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-14 (1999) ("[Municipalities] may construct,
maintain and operate . . . electric light works . . . or purchase or lease such works or
systems from any person or corporation . . . . " ) .
In a special election held on April 24, 1979, City voters authorized the sale of the
City's electrical distribution system. (R. 163.) See also Utah Code Ann. § 1-7-15 (voters
must approve the sale of a power plant or utility, though not purchase). Pursuant to that
legislative act, the "City Council reserve[d] the right" to undertake three administrative
acts: "(1) waive any irregularity or informality in any bid, (2) reject any and all bids, and
(3) resell the System as provided by law." (R. 163).
Then, on November 7, 1979, the City Council passed an ordinance (the "1979
Ordinance") that did essentially two things. (R. 172.) First, pursuant to the legislative
authorization of the voters, the 1979 Ordinance granted to Empire Electric the right to
construct, maintain, and operate an exclusive electric distribution franchise in the City of
Monticello. (Id.) This was clearly an administrative act, since it made no new law but
merely implemented the voter's legislative authorization.
Second, the 1979 Ordinance reserved an option allowing the City "to repurchase
the electrical system" after 20 years. (R. 174.) This second act - which had not been
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expressly contemplated by the voters in the special election of April 24, 1979 - was an
independent legislative act taken by the City Council acting in its legislative capacity.
Pursuant to the rights secured in the 1979 Ordinance, on March 22, 2000 the City
Council passed Resolution 2000-2 formally exercising its option to repurchase the
electrical system. (R. 216-217.) This act, which the Plaintiffs now seek to overturn by
referendum, was purely administrative in nature: it made no new law but rather executed
an option that the 1979 Ordinance had expressly preserved and plainly contemplated. In
the language of the Supreme Court, this act was "clearly within the ambit of the [City
Council's] intention when the original [1979] [Ordinance was adopted by them."
Keigley II, 89 P.2d at 484. The exercise of the option plainly "comport[s] with the
legislative policy and purpose expressed in the original ordinance." Id. at 485. As noted
above, "the governing consideration is the 'intended purpose and policy' expressed by the
enacting authority [here, the 1979 City Council], as disclosed in the terms of its
enactment [here, 1979 Ordinance] and any other acceptable evidence of intent." Wilson,
(557 P.2d at 253. In brief, Resolution 2000-2 exercising the City's 20-year old option was
an administrative act taken pursuant to established law, not the enactment of new law.
Therefore, it is not subject to a referendum.
In opposition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs invoke Keigley I for the proposition that
the purchase of an electrical distribution system is necessarily a legislative act. Keigley I
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holds no such thing, as a careful reading of the decision confirms.17 In fact, Keigley I
actually supports the City's position. The key language in Keigley /, which the Plaintiffs
quote (Br. App. at 13), is the following:
[T]he resolution of May 22, 1936 . . . was calculated to bind Provo City to
contract for or purchase an electric lighting and power system and to
operate the same until the revenue bonds were paid. The accomplishment
of that end was a matter of public policy of vital importance to the
inhabitants of the city and as such is essentially legislative in character.
63P.2dat265.
It is critical to understand that the legislative "end" that "was a matter of public
policy of vital importance" (id.) was the providing of electricity. It appears that this was
the first time Provo City had undertaken the responsibility to ensure electricity for its
citizens. The decision whether to shoulder such a responsibility in the first place was
clearly legislative in nature. The resolution "constituted] a declaration of public
purposes and ma[de] provisions of ways and means of accomplishment. . . ." Keigley II,
89 P.2d at 484. Therefore, the resolution was legislative in nature and thus subject to the
referendum power.
But what the Plaintiffs' argument ignores are the "ways and means of
accomplishment" specified by that legislation. In Keigley /, the legislative act reserved to
the city an administrative choice: Provo City could "[1.] contract for ... an electric

17

As an initial matter, it is important to note that the court's holding regarding the
nature of the resolution at issue is dicta because the resolution was later repealed: Keigley
/, 63 P.2d at 264-265. Be that as it may, Keigley I strongly supports the City's position.
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lighting and power system", "or [2.] purchase an electric lighting and power system."
Keigley I, 63 P.2d at 265 (emphasis added). The emphasized word "or" is critical. The
legislation did not bind Provo City to "purchase" an electrical system. Nor did it bind the
city to "contract" for such a system. Rather, the legislation created a choice as to which
of two possible means city administration could use to accomplish the legislative end of
providing electricity. In other words, the legislation created an option. Whether to
contract for such a system or to purchase one outright was left to the expertise and
judgment of city officials acting in their administrative capacity.
Essentially the same situation exists here. Of course, in this case the City is not
deciding in the first instance whether it will provide electricity to its residents - that
legislative decision was made long ago. But just as in Keigley I, the City Council has
been left with an administrative decision as to how best to fulfill its preexisting
commitment to provide electricity. Under the 1979 Ordinance, the City has the option of
(1) "contracting] for an electric lighting and power system", i.e., allowing the contractual
relationship with Empire Electric to be automatically renewed (R. 174), or (2)
"purchasing] an electric lighting and power system." {Id.) The City has made the
administrative decision to choose the second course, which (as in Keigley I) was not only
contemplated but expressly established in prior legislation. Plaintiffs' reliance on
Keigley I is entirely misplaced.
Case law supports the conclusion that exercise of an option is an administrative
act. The court in Beach v. City of Saline, 300 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. App. 1981), addressed
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this issue in the context of an option to purchase property. There, the city had "obtained
an option to purchase" real property for the purpose of annexation. Id. at 699. About five
months later, "the city council adopted a resolution unconditionally exercising its option
to purchase [the] property." Id. at 700. Plaintiff, an opponent of the annexation, sued to
force the city to hold a referendum on the purchase because the city attorney had refused
to allow it on the ground that the resolution exercising the option was an administrative
act outside the referendum power. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed with the city
attorney. "While the City of Saline's decision to purchase property was certainly not
'mundane5," the Court of Appeals held, "it was, nevertheless, essentially administrative"
and thus not subject to a referendum. Id. at 701. The City is aware of no case holding
that the exercise of an option to purchase property is a legislative act.
Plaintiffs argue that because the purchase of the system might be financed over a
twenty-six year period (that is by no means established at this point), it must be the sort of
"permanent" act that is legislative in nature. See Br. App. at 13-14. Morever, that is not
what is meant when the courts refer to "permanency and generality." Kansas Taxpayers
Network, 874 P.2d at 671-72. For instance, in Monahan v. Funk, 3 P.2d 778 (Or. 1931),
the court addressed whether an ordinance "authorizing the commissioner of public
utilities to purchase certain real property" to establish a public utility (a crematory site)
was legislative or administrative in nature. Id. at 778. The court held that the ordinance
was administrative because upon completion of the purchase "the ordinance in question
will practically be defunct. It prescribes no rule of civil conduct; it is not permanent,
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uniform, or universal in its application to the general public." Id. at 780 (emphasis
added).18
So too here. Resolution 2000-2 merely exercised the City's option to repurchase
property constituting an electrical system - e.g., electrical lines, street lights, meters,
poles, transformers, etc. (R. 188-189.) As in Monahan, the challenged resolution is now
essentially "defunct" - with the option already exercised and the City now contractually
bound to purchase the system, Resolution 2000-2 has no further function or application.
That is not to say that the City's decision to repurchase the electrical system is
unimportant or that it won't have an impact on City residents, but rather that the
resolution itself has no "application to the general public" and "prescribes no rule of civil
conduct." Monahan, 3 P.2d at 780. It is therefore not permanent or general in the

,8

In Whitbeck v. Funk, 12 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Or. 1932), the court likewise held that
the purchase of real property "for use as a public market" was "not legislative." See also
Lane Transit District v. Lane County, 957 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Or. 1998) ("This court has
defined legislative activity as 'making laws of general applicability and [of a] permanent
nature,' and administrative activity as that 'necessary *** to carry out legislative policies
and purposes already declared.'") (citations omitted; ellipses supplied by Lane Transit
court). Many other courts have held that the purchase of property is not a legislative act.
See, e.g. City of Idaho Springs v. Blackwell, 731 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Col. 1987) (en banc)
("[T]he selection of the site and structure for the city hall is not a permanent or general
act.... The structure is of course permanent in the sense that it will serve as the city hall
for an indefinite period of time. However, the duration of legislation or the anticipated
useful life of a municipal improvement does not completely determine the meaning of
permanence when determining whether an ordinance is legislative or administrative.
[Citation omitted.] The term 'permanent' is used to signify a declaration of public policy
of general applicability ...."); Scheetz v. Borough ofLansdale, 438 A.2d 1048 (Pa.
Cm with. Ct. 1982) (authorization of particular land purchase administrative rather than
legislative act).
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relevant sense.19
In sum, the resolution exercising the option did not make new law and thus fails
the first and decisive factor in the analysis. It was simply an administrative decision by
the City Council selecting one of two options (repurchase vs. status quo) for providing
electrical services to the City - options which previous legislation had expressly
provided. If Plaintiffs disagreed with the policy options created by the prior law, they
should have demanded a referendum in 1979. The time is now long past for that remedy.
Plaintiffs remain free, however, to make this issue the subject of the next City Council
election in an attempt to persuade a majority of the voters to elect representatives who
share their views. That is hardly the "tyranny" Plaintiffs decry.
b.

Resolution 2000-2 exercising the option does not "declare [a]

public purpose and provide ways and means to accomplish that purpose," but rather
"deals with a small segment of an overall policy question." Kansas Taxpayers Nehvork,
874 P.2d at 671-72. The declared "purpose" of the resolution was narrowly focused on
the exercise of the option: "To confirm the City's intent to exercise its option to repurchase the electrical system from Empire Electric Association." (R. 188). After the

19

Even in the narrow sense used by Plaintiffs, repurchase of the electrical system is
not permanent or general in nature. History has already demonstrated the City's
willingness to operate the system or temporarily transfer it to a third party, depending
upon the needs of the City. Nothing in the instant repurchase would preclude the City
from turning around and selling the system to a third party, or contracting with a third
party to run it. Even under Plaintiffs' definition, there is nothing permanent about the
exercise of the option.
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typical recitation of background information, Resolution 2000-2 did just that. In form
and substance, the resolution is a quintessential administrative act; it does not enact
legislation in any relevant sense. The larger public policy questions of whether the City
should even concern itself with providing electrical services to its citizens and what
options the City should have for providing such services were decided long ago. The
ordinance merely implements one of the policy options previously established by City
Council legislation and thus "deals with a small segment of an overall policy question."
c.

The third guideline is particularly important in this case

because an "intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other affairs of [the] [C]ity" was
necessary "in order to make a rational choice." Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d at
671-72; See also Shriver, 313 P.2d at 478 (addressing practicality concerns); Wilson, 657
P.2d at 253 (same). A city's decision to exercise an option to repurchase an electrical
system is principally a matter of economics, entailing a detailed understanding of the total
costs and benefits of the purchase in light of city finances, community needs, risks, and
the broader energy market. The recent extreme volatility in the energy market and the
attending difficulties of public policy makers to address it underscore the types of
complexities administrators can face when confronting such decisions.
These considerations further bolster the conclusion that the exercise of the option
in this case was an administrative act. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f the
result would be to impair the efficient administration of the municipality," the general
rule is "that initiative and referendum provisions are not applicable." Wilson, 657 P.2d at
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253 (citations omitted). Especially in today's volatile energy market, it is challenging
even for the elected members of a city council to have the knowledge and experience
necessary "to make a rational choice" about which of the City's established options
should be pursued to deliver electrical sendees. In such matters, Plaintiffs' position
would be a significant hindrance to efficiency. Moreover, allowing a referendum on this
matter will further disrupt time-sensitive transactions. Plaintiffs, who constitute a
disgruntled minority, have already impeded the "efficient administration of the
municipality" with their attempts to use the referendum power, and now this lawsuit, to
undo an already binding transaction.
d.

The final guideline recognizes that while municipal acts often

have both legislative and administrative characteristics, the right of initiative and
referendum "is restricted to measures which are quite clearly and fully legislative" in
nature. Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d at 671-72. Given the foregoing, that is
certainly not the case here. Indeed, it is difficult to discern any legislative features at all
in Resolution 2000-2. To the extent this Court finds any, the resolution's administrative
nature clearly predominates.
Accordingly, the exercise of the option is an administrative act that is not subject
to the referendum power. Plaintiffs must seek redress for their grievances from their
current elected representatives or, failing that, elect new ones. A referendum is not a
legal option.
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C.

In Deciding Whether Resolution 2000-2 Was an Administrative or
Legislative Act, the Court Should Avoid an Interpretation of Utah Law
that Risks Impairing the Obligation of Contracts in Violation of the
United States and Utah Constitutions.

It is a fundamental duty of courts "to interpret a statute if possible to avoid
potential constitutional conflicts." Cole v. Jordan School Dist, 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah
1995); Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Utah 1987). That duty fully applies to the
Court's interpretation of the statutes and case law governing municipal referenda. The
Court should avoid an interpretation of Utah law that creates a potential constitutional
conflict with the Contract Clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions.
It was undisputed in the proceedings before the district court that the City has
exercised its option. (Cf. R. 119 and R.1049 P. 34). Under Utah law, when an optionee
(here the City) under an option contract exercises its option, the contract become a
"bilateral contract" that is "absolute and binding" on both parties. Geisdorfv. Doughty,
972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) (quotations omitted); Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 775 P.2d
427, 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Fitzgerald v. Boyle, 57 Utah 234, 193 P. 1109
(1920) ("[W]hat had before been a mere offer in writing became a contract binding on
both parties and enforceable by either."); 1A Corbin on Contracts § 264, 507-12 (1963).
Therefore, the City is now contractually bound to complete the transaction or risk
breaching its contract with Empire Electric.
Both Utah and United States constitutions forbid any "law impairing the
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obligations of contracts." Utah Const. Art. I, § 18; U.S. Const. Art. I § 10.20 Courts have
adopted a three-pronged test for Contract Clause claims. "The threshold inquiry is
'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 411 (1983). If so, the second and third prongs balance the state's interest in the
impairment versus the contracting parties' interest in preserving the contract inviolate.
Id.21
A referendum voiding Resolution 2000-2 would vitiate the currently binding
contract between the City and Empire Electric, raising serious Contract Clause concerns.
Plaintiffs note that the City and Empire Electric have agreed that if a referendum voids
the option Empire Electric's franchise will be extended for 20 years subject to the 1979
Ordinance. See Br. App. at 18-19. Plaintiffs read into this agreement a guarantee that
Empire Electric could not be injured by a referendum nor the City held liable. But that is
not what the agreement says. Should the value of the system drop significantly below the
currently negotiated price, making the current price extremely profitable to Empire

20

The Contracts Clauses clearly apply to a referendum of City residents. As Utah
Const. Art. VI, § 1 makes clear, by voting in a referendum the people exercise "the
legislative power of the State." Accord Ruano v. Spellman, 505 P.2d 447, 449 (Wash.
1973). 'The prohibition [against impairment of contracts] is aimed at the legislative
power of the state...." Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Psc, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722, 726
(1939).
21

The Utah Constitution employs the same test as the federal. See George v. Oren
Ltd., and Assoc, 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983).
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Electric, the agreement does not necessary preclude Empire Electric from seeking
damages from the City for the unconstitutional, retroactive impairment of the contract.
"A contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, imposes new conditions or
lessens its value." Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 901 P.2d 1028, 1038
(Wash. 1995). The possibility of a Contract Clause claim is very real indeed.22
Plaintiffs, of course, disagree. Yet it is not necessary for the Court to hold that a
referendum voiding the existing contract between the City and Empire Electric would be
unconstitutional. As noted, this Court has a duty to "avoid potential constitutional
conflicts" when interpreting Utah law. Cole, 899 P.2d at 778. The best way to avoid the
Contracts Clause issue is to affimi the district court's holding that the City's decision to

22

In Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha, 162 F.225 (8th Cir. 1908), Omaha Water
Company's predecessor installed a water system beginning in 1880. The City of
Omaha's original franchise ordinance provided that "after the expiration of 20 years, the
city should have the right to purchase the [water] works at an appraised valuation
Id. at 227. The City of Omaha opted to exercise this option and passed an ordinance to
this effect. After an appraisal was completed, Omaha Water Company tendered a deed
conveying the system and demanded payment. Id. The City of Omaha disagreed with the
appraisal and refused payment, and the water company initiated suit. In considering
whether the city's exercise of its option could be withdrawn by subsequent legislative
action, the Eighth Circuit stated: "A contract of sale and purchase between the company
and the city arose in 1903 and which was not subject to impairment by subsequent
legislation
" Id. at 238; See also Russell v. Sebastian, 34 S.Ct. 517,522, 233 U.S.
195 (1914) (concluding that amendments to state constitution and municipal ordinances
adopted "were ineffectual to impair" utility company's contractual rights to distribute gas
to municipality under the federal contracts clause).
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exercise the option was administrative in nature. As established above, that conclusion is
well supported by Utah law and comports with the law of other jurisdictions. It has the
further virtue of avoiding a potentially serious constitutional conflict.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that the decision of the
district court be affirmed.
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